To what extent would these strategies be transferable outside the national defense budget? Use the historical statistics section of the most recent federal budget to trace the pattern of defense outlays and budget authority from 1980 through 1989. What pattern do you identify?

In preparing the fiscal 1983 plan, Mr. Weinberger was again confronted with the budget-slashing demands of Mr. Stockman. The defense chief had

many allies within the administration but by now government officials began to refer to the hegemony of the “majority of two,” Mr. Weinberger

and President Reagan. With unwavering White House support, the defense secretary shot down an OMB attempt to chop $20 billion from the proposed

defense budget, then offered an unusual set of cuts himself. In what became a recurring feature of the budget process, the Pentagon stripped

billions from its budget simply by adjusting the inflation assumptions. Weapons programs remained intact.

In defending the budget on Capitol Hill, Mr. Weinberger emphasized “the Soviet threat” and insisted that economic and fiscal concerns shouldn’t

influence the Pentagon’s spending. But deficit concerns were mounting nonetheless and world financial markets were unusually jittery. When the

administration sought $257 billion for defense in fiscal 1983, Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-N.Y.), chairman of the defense appropriations

subcommittee, declared that defense is not sacrosanct in the deficit-cutting effort. In the Senate, Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) opened

Budget Committee hearings with the declaration that “the hemorrhage of the budget deficit must be alleviated.” The committee pressed Secretary

Weinberger to suggest modest cuts from the proposed Pentagon budget, but the secretary refused. He said he hoped Congress wouldn’t be “unwise

enough” to reduce the budget request at all. Congress, while hammeringaway at the Pentagon to offer up cuts was loath to impose its own set of

reductions. When the face-off ended, Congress gave the Pentagon budget authority of $245 billion, $12 billion less than the $25 billion the

administration asked for but still 13 percent, or $29 billion, more than it got the previous year.

1984

Preparations of the defense budget for fiscal 1984 brought another confrontation with Mr. Stockman, who demanded that Mr. Weinberger take $11

billion out of his planned $284.7 billion budget. The Pentagon, expert at protecting weapons programs through what observers call “cut

insurance,” was ready to meet these demands almost painlessly. Inflation assumptions were lowered, fuel-price calculations adjusted, and some

military-construction projects postponed. In addition, a planned pay increase was dropped. In presenting a new budget request for $273.4

billion, Mr. Weinberger declared: “We have reached the bone.” Many legislators expressed outrage at Mr. Weinberger’s refusal to consider other

cuts despite mounting economic worries over the government’s budget deficit. Sen. Don Riegle, a Democrat from badly pressed Michigan, asserted

that the United States had a defense secretary “whose basic judgment is dangerous to our country.” Mr. Weinberger replied: “You have

accomplished your principal purpose, which is to launch a demagogic attack on me in time for the afternoon and evening editions.” The debate had

become more rancorous, but the Pentagon’s tactics still produced results. When the war of words ended, Congress granted the Pentagon 93 percent

of the spending authority it sought—a $262.2 billion budget, up 8 percent, or $20.2 billion from the previous year.

1985

Deficit-reduction efforts in early 1984 centered on making a “down payment” against the deficit in fiscal 1985. After another skirmish with Mr.

Stockman, Mr. Weinberger agreed to seek a 15 percent increase that would bring the Pentagon’s spending authority to $305 billion. House

Democrats assailed the plan, but as in the past, they wanted Mr. Weinberger to suggest the cuts, rather than slash on their own initiative

politically popular military programs in an election year. Mr. Weinberger refused, saying: “We need it all.” Congress didn’t give him the full

$305 billion he sought but again provided 93 percent of that; it approved a fiscal 1985 military budget of $284.7 billion, up 7 percent, or

$19.5 billion, from the previous year.

1986

The contest over the fiscal 1986 budget is following the pattern of early years. Mr. Weinberger called for a 13 percent increase in a budget he

said had been “scrubbed” down to the basics. After Mr. Stockman’s demands for cuts gathered support from other cabinet members, Mr. Weinberger

made accounting adjustments to produce $6.2 billion in reductions. Further cuts? Mr. Weinberger asserts that the budget he presented is the

“bare minimum.” When pushed to suggest some cuts, Mr. WeinChapterberger recently resorted to what’s called “the Washington Monument strategy”—

for “cut my budget and I’ll close the Washington Monument” (or something equally visible). During Senate hearings, the defense secretary warned

that if Congress cuts the Pentagon budget, there would be a slowdown in the B-1 bomber project, elimination of two Trident submarines, and

cancellation of a multiple-launch rocket system—all considered high-priority programs. Some participants say the ritual is getting tiring. “It’s

the same Kabuki dance,” says one Senate Budget Committee aide, “but Domenici is getting extremely frustrated with it.”

Mikesell, John. Fiscal Administration (Page 91- Page 94). Cengage Textbook. Kindle Edition.