In Paul. the seller of real estate knew. before the closing, that he was required to install a storm sewer if a drainage ditch on the property were eliminated. Instead of installing the storm sewer, the sellers simply filled the ditch and sold the property. Buyers of the land sued the sellers when they learned they had to put in an expensive sewer system. The sellers defended on the grounds that they had no affirmative duty to disclose the ditch to the buyers. The court found this argument . stating: Such a duty is not necessary an active con. such as the filling in of the ditch alleged in this case is to be distinguished from a simple nondisclosure…. Plaintiff's complaint sees forth faces alleging an active concealment of the drainage ditch and is without the assertion of a duty to speak. The common law clearly distinguishes between concealment and nondisclosure. The former is characterized by deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion. sac prevent further inquiry into a material matter. The latter is characterized by mere silence. “Thus, fraudulent concealment—without any misrepresentation or duty to disclose—can constitute common law fraud.” The Funds in the instant case allege the Bank actively strategized to cover up the pending collapse of Symington' financial condition. This allegation fits the definition of concealment, not nondisclosure. Three evidentiary points are clear: the “unjustified and imprudent” loan extensions: the forbearance until one day after the date for the Mercado take-out obligation: and the failure to report Symington's false statements to federal banking authorities. The record reveals evidence of internal bank communications and communication between Symington aides and the Bank. Applying the law, we conclude that the Funds were not required to establish an affirmative duty to speak in order to prove fraudulent concealment. Actions by the Bank which intended to conceal material facts are, if proven, sufficient. In the final analysis, we reach two conclusions as to the fraudulent concealment claim: there are reason-able inferences from which a jury could find (I) the Bank had knowledge of false information being given the Funds, and (2) the Bank took measures intended to prevent the Funds from learning the truth. These inferences are grounded in fact and are sufficient to take the concealment theory to the jury. The opinion of the court of appeals is vacated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. What are three types of fraud?
2. Why was the bank under no duty to disclose Symington 's financial condition to the Funds?
3. Cave an example to Illustrate the difference between knowing a material fact and fading to disclose x and 'concealing' the fact.